Chapter 6 - Persistence

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    Annotated Bibliography

    Judith Jarvis Thomson. 1983. Parthood and Identity Across Time.
    http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026004
    Critique of the doctrine of temporal parts
    Mark Heller. 1984. Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects.
    http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319714
    A response to Thomson’s worries about the existence of temporal parts
    Peter van Inwagen. 2000. Temporal Parts and Identity Across Time.
    http://www.jstor.org/stable/27903696
    A defense of three-dimensionalism
    Sally Haslanger. 1989. Persistence, Change, and Explanation.
    http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320029
    Argues that we should address the problem of persistence by examining what is required to provide adequate explanations; defends three-dimensionalism
    Trenton Merricks. 1994. Endurance and Indiscernibility.
    http://www.jstor.org/stable/2940769
    A defense and elaboration of endurantism
    Theodore Sider. 1996. All the World’s a Stage.
    http://tedsider.org/papers/
    Defends the stage theory or exdurantism
    Mark Heller. 1992. Things Change.
    http://www.jstor.org/stable/2108216
    A defense of four-dimensionalism from objections that it denies rather than explains objects’ persistence through change
    Ryan Wasserman. 2003. The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics.
    http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
    Expands on Lewis’s objection to the view that shapes and other temporary properties may be conceived as relations to times
    Rae Langton and David Lewis. 1998. Defining ‘Intrinsic.’
    http://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/
    Proposes a definition of what it is to be an intrinsic property
    Berit Brogaard. 2000. Presentist Four-Dimensionalism.
    http://www.jstor.org/stable/
    A presentist version of four-dimensionalism is offered to respond to the worry that four-dimensionalism eliminates change
    David Lewis. 1976. Survival and Identity.
    http://www.andrewmbailey.com/dkl/
    Four-dimensionalism applied to the problem of personal identity

    Annotated Weblinks

    http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/temporal-parts/
    The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on temporal parts by Katherine Hawley.
    http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/
    The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on identity over time by Andre Gallois.
    http://www.philosophyideas.com/
    A list of views denying identity over time at PhilosophyIdeas.
    http://www.philosophyideas.com/
    A list of views about identity over time at PhilosophyIdeas.
    http://www.philosophyideas.com/
    A list of views about four dimensionalism at PhilosophyIdeas.
    http://www.philosophyideas.com/
    A list of views about three dimensionalism at PhilosophyIdeas.

    Discussion Questions

    1. How might someone defend the claim that four dimensionalism is inconsistent with the existence of genuine persistence?
    2. In your view, does the perdurantist provide a better or worse account of the Statue and the Lump than the strategies canvassed in Chapter 3? Explain what you take to be the best strategy for responding to that problem.
    3. What is the relationship between mereological universalism and four dimensionalism? Must a four dimensionalist be a mereological universalist?
    4. The text introduces an analogy, on behalf of the four dimensionalist, between temporal overlap and spatial overlap. Do you agree that temporal overlap is no more problematic than spatial overlap? Explain.
    5. Do you think velocity is an intrinsic property or an extrinsic property?
    6. Provide an argument in numbered premise form, using Lewis’s problem of temporary intrinsics, for the conclusion that endurantism is false.
    7. What do you think is the most plausible solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics?
    8. In the case of the Ship of Theseus, the perdurantist and exdurantist will disagree about how many ships are present at the initial time. What will they each say? Does this provide a reason to favor one or the other of these versions of four dimensionalism?
    9. Do you agree with Wiggins that we should have a different theory of persistence for objects than we do for events? Why or why not?
    10. In your own words, explain van Inwagen’s “two-year man” story. What is it meant to show?