Chapter 7 - Modality

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Annotated Bibliography

Theodore Sider. 2003. Reductive Theories of Modality.: http://tedsider.org/papers/; An overview of several strategies to reduce the modal to the nonmodal
Phillip Bricker. 2006. Absolute Actuality and the Plurality of Worlds.: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/; A defense of a rival version of modal realism to that of David Lewis
Robert Adams. 1974. Theories of Actuality.: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214751; A defense of actualism, reducing possible worlds to propositions
Robert Stalnaker. 1976. Possible Worlds.: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214477; Argues for the view that propositions are sets of possible worlds, with worlds being genuine, irreducible entities, though less than alternative universes
Peter Forrest. 1986. Ways Worlds Could Be.: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/; A theory of possible worlds as uninstantiated properties
Gideon Rosen. 1990. Modal Fictionalism.: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2255102; Defense of fictionalism about modality
Berit Brogaard. 2006. Two Modal-isms: Fictionalism and Ersatzism.: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/; Explores two ways of using modal language without incurring commitment to concrete possible worlds
Jenann Ismael. Forthcoming. An Empiricist’s Guide to Objective Modality.: http://www.jenanni.com/papers/; Considers the role of modal notions, especially in scientific theories, to defend a form of instrumentalism about modality
Theodore Sider. 2002. The Ersatz Pluriverse.: http://www.tedsider.org/papers/ersatz_pluriverse.pdf; Defends a nonreductive theory of modality
W.V.O. Quine. Three Grades of Modal Involvement.: http://comet.lehman.cuny.edu/fitting/; A declaration of skepticism about modality
Ruth Barcan Marcus. 1961. Modalities and Intensional Languages.: http://link.springer.com/article/; Defends modality and modal logic against Quinean skepticism
Laurie Paul. 2006. In Defense of Essentialism.: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/; A defense of essentialism
Penelope Mackie. 1987. Essence, Origin and Bare Identity.: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2255146; An account intended to explain away the intuition behind origin essentialism
Kit Fine. 1994. Essence and Modality.: http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/; Argues that essence cannot be reduced to facts about necessity
Stephen Yablo. 1993. Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2108052; Explores some strategies for moving from claims about what is conceivable to claims about what is possible
David Chalmers. 2002. Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?: http://consc.net/papers/conceivability.html; Distinguishes concepts of conceivability and possibility in order to assess in which species of conceivability entail possibility
Saul Kripke. 1971. Identity and Necessity.: http://dmurcho.com/docs/idnec.pdf; Defends the necessity of identity claims
Hilary Putnam. The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.: http://mcps.umn.edu/assets/pdf/7.3_Putnam.pdf; Provides examples of the necessary a posteriori such as ‘water is H2O,’ via the famous Twin Earth scenario

Annotated Weblinks

http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/modality-and-metaphysics/: An interview with Timothy Williamson at 3:AM Magazine on modality and other topics.
http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/the-possible-worlds-hedgehog/: An interview with Robert Stalnaker at 3:AM Magazine on modality and other topics.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-worlds/: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on possible worlds by Christopher Menzel.
http://www.philosophyideas.com/: A list of various views about de dicto and de re modality at PhilosophyIdeas.
http://www.philosophyideas.com/: A list of various views about the existence of possible worlds at PhilosophyIdeas.
http://www.philosophyideas.com/: A list of various views about modal fictionalism at PhilosophyIdeas.
http://www.philosophyideas.com/: A list of various criticisms of possible worlds at PhilosophyIdeas.
http://www.philosophyideas.com/: A list of various views about the metaphysics of possible worlds at PhilosophyIdeas.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on varieties of modality by Boris Kment.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on modal fictionalism by Daniel Nolan.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on David Lewis's modal realism by Brian Weatherson.

Discussion Questions

What might Wittgenstein mean when he says that necessary claims are nonfactual? For example, what could it mean to say that ‘Two is prime’ is nonfactual?
Give an example of a claim involving de dicto modality.
Give an example of a claim involving de re modality.
According to Lewis’s modal realism, would it have been possible for there to have been nothing rather than something? Why or why not?
How is Lewis’s argument for the existence of other possible worlds (a) similar to and (b) different in method from that of the scientist postulating the existence of unseen objects like quarks?
What is an example of a possibility an ersatz modal realist might have a problem accommodating if her worlds were constructed out of ordinary English language sentences?
What is the difference between modal fictionalism and ersatz modal realism? Aren’t they both the view that possibilities are just stories?
Are you convinced by Kripke’s argument for the claim that the Queen’s origins are essential to her? Why or why not?
Why do you think some philosophers want to avoid commitment to essential properties?
What is a response a conventionalist about modality might make to the case of the necessary a posteriori?